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Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea 
Bargaining: An Essay in Honor of              
Fred Zacharias 
R. MICHAEL CASSIDY* 
Fred Zacharias was an accomplished scholar who authored over fifty 
law review articles in an academic career spanning thirty years at 
Cornell and the University of San Diego law schools.  A leader in the 
field of professional responsibility, Zacharias unapologetically promoted 
the view that lawyers have important professional obligations beyond 
simply advancing the interests of their clients, including obligations to 
the court, the legal system, and the public.  Having served as chair of the 
American Association of Law Schools Professional Responsibility 
Section, as editor and frequent contributor to its newsletter, and as a 
consultant to the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, Zacharias was one of the leading modern scholars 
in the field of legal ethics and certainly one of the most cited.  Perhaps 
his greatest intellectual contribution to the discourse about attorney 
conduct lays in his work in my own field—the subspecialty of 
prosecutorial ethics.  Zacharias was a regular commentator on the use 
and abuse of prosecutorial power and frequently lamented that courts, 
rules drafters, and disciplinary boards have done very little to curtail 
prosecutorial misconduct.  Zacharias penned seventeen law review 
 *  © 2011 R. Michael Cassidy.  Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  I 
am grateful to my colleague Mary Ann Neary, Associate Law Librarian for Education 
and Reference at Boston College Law School, for her advice and direction during this 
project, and to my students Jessica Yau and Robert Hatfield, Boston College Law School 
class of 2011, for their very capable research support. 
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articles on the subject of prosecutorial ethics, nine of them coauthored 
with Professor Bruce Green of Fordham Law School. 
Academics frequently walk in the footsteps of the giants who preceded 
them.  I certainly have felt Fred Zacharias’s enormous influence in my own 
career—especially, but not exclusively, with respect to his many 
contributions in the field of prosecutorial ethics.  I always learned 
something new whenever I read one of Zacharias’s articles, even when I 
disagreed with him.  His opinions challenged me to question and rethink 
my own, and his research opened up new vistas of inquiry for me. 
I was first “introduced” to Fred Zacharias (virtually) in 1992 when I 
read his important early work Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial 
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?1  A prosecutor at the time, 
I was deeply interested in legal ethics and responsible for the 
professional training of lawyers within my office.  That article struck me 
then, as it does now, as a watershed work.  Zacharias was not 
comfortable construing a prosecutor’s obligation as a “minister of 
justice”2 as a mere hortatory ideal, devoid of any moral content or 
direction.  This “special prosecutorial duty is worded so vaguely that it 
obviously requires further explanation,” yet ethics codes “provide 
remarkably little guidance on its meaning.”3  Zacharias’s 1991 
Vanderbilt article began to put some much-needed flesh on the “do-
justice” bones, a project that he continued for the next two decades. 
Zacharias recognized that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
“do not exempt prosecutors from the [basic] requirement[] of zealous 
advocacy” on behalf of their client—the state.4  But at the trial stage of 
criminal proceedings, a prosecutor also has a duty to ensure that the 
basic elements of a fully adversarial system exist, which Zacharias 
identified as (1) attorneys who are competent, (2) attorneys who possess 
a similar level of resources and information, and (3) a tribunal that is 
neutral.5  These are the essential premises upon which our adversarial 
system is based.  The only way that prosecutors can both do justice and 
still act as aggressive advocates at trial is if they take an adversarial 
view of justice rather than an outcome-oriented view.6  “The paradigm 
 1. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010). 
 3. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 46; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, 
The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of 
Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“Language in the codes exhorting prosecutors 
to serve justice has been similarly ignored, largely because of the codes’ failure to define the 
meaning of ‘justice.’”). 
 4. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 52. 
 5. See id. at 61. 
 6. See id. at 53. 
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of the prosecutor as an unaligned ‘minister of the system’ makes sense in 
the trial context only if it targets situations in which competitive fact-
finding will not produce results that are ‘acceptable’ within the meaning 
of the adversary system.”7  When the adversarial process breaks down at 
trial in any significant respect, the code can “no longer expect 
competition to achieve adversarially appropriate results.”8  Zacharias 
concluded that when any one of these three building blocks is absent, 
“prosecutors must help reestablish the essential adversarial balance that 
is missing.”9  The remainder of Zacharias’s 1991 article goes on to 
explore in probing detail exactly how prosecutors might correct an 
adversarial imbalance at trial in certain situations without disserving the 
state’s other important interests.10 
The disciplinary codes ask prosecutors to be conscious at all times of a 
“dual, somewhat schizophrenic”11 responsibility; that is, they must act 
simultaneously as “player and referee,”12 zealous advocate and minister 
of justice.  What Zacharias recognized in 1991—and indeed emphasized 
throughout his writing career—was that prosecutors are uniquely situated 
among legal advocates to seek “justice” because they are “unencumbered 
by [formal] client ties.”13  Zacharias perceived a prosecutor’s representation 
of the state as a form of “multirepresentation” of several constituencies 
simultaneously.14  A prosecutor must consider the victim’s interest in 
retribution, the community’s interest in deterrence and public safety, the 
defendant’s entitlement to a fair process, and the system’s need for 
efficient resolution of disputes.15  Viewing a prosecutor as having 
constituencies rather than clients helps emphasize the importance of 
contextualized decisionmaking, in contrast to a purer agency model 
where lawyers identify their clients’ interests and then pursue those 
interests zealously within the bounds of the law.16  Because the 
prosecutor represents various constituencies whose interests might at 
times diverge, it is essential to seek some method of ordering priorities.  
 7. Id. at 60. 
 8. Id. at 61. 
 9. Id. at 62. 
 10. Id. at 65–102. 
 11. Id. at 107. 
 12. Id. at 110. 
 13. Id. at 60. 
 14. Id. at 57. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 5–6 (2005). 
CASSIDY POST-AUTHOR PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2011  1:06 PM 
 
4 
 
It is on these occasions that the do-justice mandate, while admittedly 
vague, serves to highlight for prosecutors the importance of a thoughtful, 
careful, and nuanced balancing of interests.  So-called integrity rules, 
such as the do-justice exhortation in comment 1 to rule 3.8, serve as 
reminders to prosecutors about the limits of their adversarial role.17 
I have been thinking recently about Zacharias’s “procedural 
fairness”18 concept with respect to research I am doing on plea 
bargaining.  Maintaining a fair process might work as a touchstone for 
justice at the trial stage of criminal proceedings, where the adversarial 
system is perhaps closest to a real competition.  Making sure the deck is 
fairly stacked seems like a laudable and indeed necessary goal if we 
hope for trials to produce an acceptable result—a result that is as likely 
as humanly possible to be accurate and a result that will be respected by 
both the participants and the community.  But between ninety and 
ninety-five percent of criminal charges are resolved by plea bargain 
rather than by trial.19  Whether one views a plea bargain as a 
“compromise”20 for efficiency sake or as a “contract,”21 the model of 
procedural fairness Zacharias constructed in 1991 does not accurately 
capture a prosecutor’s primary ethical concerns because at the plea 
bargaining stage of a criminal case the facts and legal outcomes are 
bargained for rather than contested, and no neutral fact finder is deciding 
the case.  So if procedural fairness cannot be an adequate guidepost for 
justice during plea bargaining, what can we substitute in its place? 
Given the pervasiveness of plea bargaining in the criminal justice 
system, it may seem startling at first blush that the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the disciplinary rules in effect in most states 
have so little to say about it.  Model Rule 3.8, entitled “Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” is silent on the subject.22  Admittedly, 
there are other disciplinary rules—applicable to lawyers in all aspects of 
their work—that constrain a prosecutor’s conduct during plea bargaining.  
For example, the prohibition in Model Rule 8.4 of dishonesty or 
misrepresentation would prohibit a prosecutor from falsely characterizing 
the facts or available evidence in order to induce a defendant to plead 
 17. Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 559 (2009). 
 18. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 62. 
 19. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 223 tbl.9.1 (2003); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. 
L.J. 731, 732 (2010). 
 20. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 
1969, 1975–77 (1992). 
 21. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 (1992). 
 22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010). 
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guilty.23  The requirement of candor to the tribunal in Model Rule 
3.3(a)(1) would prohibit a prosecutor from making false statements to 
the court in order to induce the court to accept a bargained-for change of 
plea, such as misstating or minimizing the defendant’s prior criminal 
record in order to obtain a favorable sentence, or misstating the evidence 
in order to satisfy the elements of an offense other than the one 
originally charged in the indictment.24  Model Rule 3.4(f), prohibiting an 
attorney from requesting a person other than a client or relative or 
employee of a client to refrain from giving relevant information to 
another party, would preclude a prosecutor from entering into a plea 
agreement with a defendant in a multiple-party case on the condition that 
the defendant refuse to testify on behalf of or cooperate with a 
codefendant.25  But that is essentially it.  Aside from those general 
proscriptions, a prosecutor’s conduct during plea negotiations is pretty 
much unregulated as a professional matter except by the do-justice 
admonition. 
Why do the disciplinary rules take such a “hands-off” approach to plea 
bargaining?  The courts tend to look to contract principles to ascertain 
the legitimacy and enforceability of plea agreements.26  Both sides 
achieve an advantage by resolving matters short of trial.  The 
prosecution conserves government resources and avoids the privacy, 
safety, and other concerns that may be raised by calling victims and 
other civilian witnesses to the stand.  The defendant avoids the 
uncertainties of litigation, achieves a more prompt resolution of the 
dispute than the defendant otherwise would, minimizes the public 
spectacle and embarrassment that may flow from a public airing of the 
charges, and often reduces the defendant’s exposure to punishment 
through either charge bargaining or an agreed or capped sentencing 
recommendation.  It is this mutuality of advantage that causes courts to 
look at plea bargaining through the lens of contract: both sides are giving 
something up, and both sides are getting something in return.  Due to the 
prevailing contract framework, a defendant’s waiver of certain statutory 
and constitutional rights in a plea agreement will be enforced after 
 23. Id. R. 8.4. 
 24. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). 
 25. See also Id. R. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another 
party’s access to evidence . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). 
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conviction and imposition of sentence if they are entered into voluntarily 
and knowingly.27  In any given case, there may be power inequities and 
imbalances in incentives and information between the prosecution and 
the defense.  For example, the defendant may have a stronger incentive 
to plead guilty if the defendant is otherwise facing a harsh mandatory 
sentence; the prosecution may have a stronger incentive to recommend a 
lenient sentence if its evidence is weak or it needs the defendant to 
cooperate in the prosecution of others.  But absent unconscionability or 
adhesion, an imbalance of bargaining power alone typically will not be 
considered sufficient grounds to decline to enforce a contract.28 
Bar disciplinary authorities, and by extension the state supreme courts 
that authorize and supervise them, appear to be uninterested in 
regulating plea bargaining for reasons very similar to the nonchalant 
approach that they take to enforcement of rule 3.8(d), which requires 
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence.29  That is, they assume 
that contract principles, coupled with a trial court’s obligation to conduct 
a plea colloquy that ensures both that there is a factual basis for the plea 
and that the defendant’s relinquishment of rights is voluntary and 
informed,30 will be sufficient to curtail prosecutorial misconduct, just as 
those courts assume that the constitutional disclosure obligations under 
Brady v. Maryland 31 and local rules of criminal procedure will be 
adequate to police a prosecutor’s discovery obligations.32  With these 
safeguards in place, why should we seek consensus around what it 
means to seek justice in the plea bargaining context? 
Zacharias’s 1998 article, Justice in Plea Bargaining, made a 
compelling case for the vitality of the do-justice obligation, even at the 
plea bargaining stage of criminal cases.33  If one accepts the premise that 
 27. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).  Although some circuits will 
refuse to enforce a defendant’s waiver in a plea agreement if such a waiver would result 
in a “miscarriage of justice,” see, e.g., United States v. Burns, 409 F.3d 994, 996 (8th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001), this safety valve is 
not dissimilar to a court’s common law ability to refuse to enforce the terms of a contract 
if it would violate public policy.  See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 954–55 (1984). 
 28. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 144 (2005). 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)–(2); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 31. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 32. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady 
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 732–34 (1987); Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 760 (2001). 
 33. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1121 (1998). 
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the overriding goals of the criminal justice system are to punish the 
guilty and protect the innocent, it is an undesired result if an innocent 
defendant pleads guilty to a crime that the defendant did not commit.  
Zacharias recognized several reasons why this happens and why legal 
ethicists should be concerned about it.  First, there may be an imperfect 
flow of information from the prosecution to the defense, leading the 
defendant to believe that the government’s case is stronger than it is.34  
Second, the defense attorney might be communicating poorly with the 
client or otherwise providing inadequate representation due to the 
presence of factors such as an overwhelming caseload, insufficient 
investigatory resources, laziness, or a desire to curry favor with the 
government.35  The defense attorney could also be laboring under an 
undisclosed conflict of interest.36  Any of these forms of agency cost37 
might lead to an inaccurate guilty plea.  The defendant might be 
dissatisfied with the services of the lawyer but not in a position 
economically to hire a new one.38  Finally, the defendant might be 
facing a harsh mandatory sentence and could rationally view a plea of 
 34. Id. at 1159.  Just what forms of “exculpatory” evidence prosecutors are 
constitutionally required to disclose prior to a guilty plea is a question left unsettled by 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), where the Court ruled that due process was 
not violated where the government conditioned a fast-track plea offer on the defendant’s 
waiver of her right to impeachment information.  Id. at 633.  Evidence supporting factual 
innocence was not waived or alleged to have been withheld in Ruiz, so the Court did not 
need to address whether a waiver of this most substantial form of exculpatory evidence 
was enforceable or whether a plea of guilty in the face of its nondisclosure could later be 
vacated.  Id. at 631.  Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, seeming to suggest 
that because Brady v. Maryland was designed to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, 
it may have no application whatsoever to a prosecutor’s discovery obligations prior to a 
guilty plea.  Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring); see generally John G. Douglass, 
Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 
437 (2001). 
 35. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1175–76; see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining 
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2476 (2004). 
 36. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 414 
(1998). 
 37. Of course, the prosecutors may encounter agency problems of their own with 
respect to their representation of the state that may lead them to offer unduly lenient 
sentence offers notwithstanding society’s interests in optimal deterrence.  A prosecutor’s 
goals might fail to be completely congruent with that of the principal when political or 
career advancement concerns make the prosecutor unduly risk averse about the 
possibilities of acquittal, or when issues of job satisfaction or desire for leisure time 
cause the prosecutor to prefer a guilty plea to a more extended trial.  See Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–88 (1992). 
 38. Zacharias, supra note 36, at 414–15. 
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guilty to a lesser offense—even one that the defendant did not commit—
as preferable to “rolling the dice” at trial.39 
In Justice in Plea Bargaining, Zacharias wisely suggested that 
prosecutors cannot possibly identify “just” conduct in the context of plea 
bargaining without a clearer picture of what plea bargaining is supposed 
to accomplish.40  Zacharias identified eight possible rationales for plea 
bargaining: approximating trial results, allowing the prosecutor to take 
equitable and mitigating factors into account, pursuing equalization 
among defendants, empowering the participants, recognizing the 
inevitable, saving resources, maximizing deterrence, and improving the 
position of both parties.41  Discussing a series of deftly constructed 
hypotheticals, Zacharias demonstrated how “applying different theories 
of plea bargaining produces different conceptions of justice.”42  
According to Zacharias, the profession cannot possibly ascertain what 
justice means in the context of plea bargaining unless and until it decides 
on the primary objective being pursued.43  Zacharias concluded that 
prosecutors’ offices should identify ex ante the plea bargaining theory or 
theories to which they ascribe so that individual prosecutors are not left 
to impose their own individual views of justice on the defendant and the 
public in an arbitrary and internally inconsistent way.44 
The important insight of Zacharias’s 1998 article stems not so much 
from the conclusions he reached—they were admittedly tentative45—but 
from the challenge he presented.  I would like to pick up where 
Zacharias left off in identifying the state’s legitimate objectives during 
plea bargaining in the hopes that this might help us shape a model of just 
conduct for prosecutors.  But first, my own feelings about justice and 
plea bargaining differ from Zacharias’s in two very important respects. 
First, I believe Zacharias’s eight possible theories of plea bargaining 
conflated rationales for engaging in plea bargaining—as opposed to 
insisting on public trials for resolving criminal disputes—with the 
objectives that a prosecutor might properly seek to pursue during plea 
bargaining once the prosecutor decides to engage in that process.  
Inevitability, likely approximation of trial results and improving the 
positions of both parties are apologias for the plea bargaining process 
itself that clearly fall into the former category, while achieving equity in 
individual cases and equality across multiple cases are objectives to be 
 39. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1145–47. 
 40. Id. at 1126. 
 41. Id. at 1137. 
 42. Id. at 1150. 
 43. See id. at 1127. 
 44. Id. at 1127, 1184–85. 
 45. Id. at 1150. 
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pursued during plea bargaining that clearly fall into the latter.46  I think 
this is an important distinction because a prosecutor striving to do justice 
within a plea bargaining milieu should be focusing primarily on the 
results to be achieved rather than the reason the prosecutor agreed to 
engage in the process in the first place. 
Second, Zacharias suggested that electing a “primary theory” of plea 
bargaining is a prerequisite to developing a coherent and nonarbitrary 
model of justice.47  I am skeptical that a single coherent theory of plea 
bargaining exists or can be agreed upon by any single prosecutorial 
entity—not to mention the profession as a whole.  Moreover, I think it is 
possible to advance the dialogue about what it means to do justice in the 
context of plea bargaining while recognizing that prosecutors have a 
number of valid interests they are seeking to advance simultaneously, so 
long as those interests are not inherently antagonistic.  That is, the fact 
that our disciplinary norms vest prosecutors with discretion to balance 
priorities in the context of individual cases does not mean there are not 
better (more just) and worse (unjust) outcomes that can flow from this 
deliberative process.  The key to ethical judgment is practical wisdom 
or, what Aristotle termed, “phronesis.”48  This requires sensitivity to the 
salient features of each particular situation and the ability to synthesize 
thoughtfully the multiplicity of interests at stake.49 
What is the “multiplicity of interests” at stake in plea bargaining?  I 
believe that a prosecutor’s primary objectives during plea bargaining 
should be efficiency, equality, autonomy, and transparency.  A thoughtful 
balancing of these interests will approximate justice.  Disregard for one 
or more of these interests, or a failure to calibrate them properly in 
individual cases, will result in injustice.  First, I will define each of these 
terms.  Then I will identify two troublesome yet recurring situations that 
arise in the plea bargaining setting that, in my view, violate a 
prosecutor’s duty to do justice but are currently not prohibited by any 
specific disciplinary rule.  I will then try to demonstrate how a focus on 
 46. In my view, empowering the defendant, saving resources, and maximizing 
deterrence might properly be viewed both as reasons to plea bargain and objectives to be 
pursued within a plea bargaining setting. 
 47. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1188. 
 48. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 179–80 (Christopher Rowe trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 49. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach 
Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 
650–51 (2006). 
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efficiency, equality, autonomy, and transparency might help prosecutors 
navigate these ethical minefields. 
Efficiency.  A prosecutor should be seeking in a plea agreement to 
achieve the maximum amount of deterrent value at the lowest possible 
cost to the state.  That is, the prosecutor should (1) seek to assess the 
likely sentence the defendant will face for the criminal conduct were the 
defendant to be convicted following trial, and then (2) discount this 
sentence by the risk of acquittal and the external costs to the state of 
proceeding to trial, including threat to witness safety, privacy, fees for 
experts, and so forth.50 
Equality.  A prosecutor should attempt to achieve horizontal equity 
across cases and across time.  That is, similarly situated defendants 
should be treated similarly in terms of the deals they are offered.51  
Exact equality of circumstance is difficult to imagine—even with 
similarly charged crimes—because defendants differ in their criminal 
records, and crimes are committed with differing levels of impact on the 
community.  But the challenge here is for prosecutors to articulate 
differences that are relevant and meaningful and disregard those that are 
not.  For example, a prosecutor should not offer a more lenient plea 
bargain to a defendant than someone previously prosecuted for a similar 
crime because the prosecutor is on more friendly terms with the 
defendant’s counsel or because the prosecutor identifies in some 
reflexive way with the present defendant’s personal background or 
circumstances.  Simply put, a prosecutor should not favor or disfavor 
one defendant over another on any grounds that society is not prepared 
to say are relevant to the degree of the defendant’s moral 
blameworthiness. 
Autonomy.  This theory of plea bargaining assumes that it is a good 
thing for the defendant to participate in important decisions that affect 
the defendant’s life.52  Plea bargaining allows a defendant to take 
ownership and responsibility for the criminal conduct that led to the 
 50. Under an efficiency rationale, a prosecutor would attempt to predict the likely 
result after trial and discount it by the risk of acquittal and the external costs of litigation.  
Predicting the sentence after trial allows a prosecutor to take into account the same 
mitigating factors regarding the crime or the defendant’s background that the judge would be 
able to consider at sentencing, or what Zacharias called “equitable” considerations.  
Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1137 & n.43.  The one outlier to this assumption is when the trial 
judge has no sentencing discretion, and the prosecutor seeks through plea bargaining to 
avoid the harsh impact of a mandatory sentence on equitable grounds, such as a “three-
strikes-and-you-are-out” statute.  Here I think that equity would be a consideration 
independent of the four I identify above. 
 51. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV. 652, 680 (1981) (arguing that a just sentence is one that treats defendants equally 
with respect to their degrees of culpability). 
 52. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1143. 
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indictment, and thus begin the process of rehabilitation and restorative 
justice that are necessary to repair the harm and eventually reintegrate 
the defendant into the community.53  The autonomy or 
“empowerment”54 model suggests that, when the defendant is able to 
participate meaningfully in the process leading to the guilty plea and 
sentence, the defendant will be more invested in the outcome, more 
likely to accept it as legitimate, and more likely to benefit penologically 
from its terms.  Because this theory is premised on consent, it assumes 
that the defendant’s decisions in the plea bargaining process are 
voluntary and informed. 
Transparency.  Public criticism of plea bargaining seems to run the 
gamut from a perception that the state sometimes steamrolls innocent 
citizens to the perception that plea bargaining is a form of “bargain-
basement justice” that lets the guilty off too lightly.  If the public loses 
faith in the fairness or legitimacy of plea bargaining, it undermines the 
deterrent value of the criminal law.  One of a prosecutor’s objectives 
during plea bargaining thus should be to counter or eliminate the 
perception of backroom politics.  This has three implications.  First, if a 
prosecutorial entity has office policies with respect to plea bargaining, 
for example, “charges carrying minimum-mandatory sentences will not 
be reduced after indictment in the absence of the defendant’s agreement 
to cooperate in the prosecution of others,” these policies should be in 
writing and fairly accessible to the defense bar in order to create a level 
playing field.55  Second, an individual prosecutor’s reasons for 
recommending charging or sentencing concessions in specific cases 
should be fully explained on the record at the time of the defendant’s 
 53. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 303, 313 (“The agreement into which the offender enters is only part of the 
means to that greater end.  Because reconciliation is its goal, restorative justice implicitly 
recognizes that crime does more than cause harm: it damages the trust and equality that 
ideally define the relationship existing among all citizens of a genuine political community.  
The offender’s crime breached that trust and denied that equality.  The repair of that 
relationship is thus the real goal of restorative justice practices.”). 
 54. See Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human 
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 699 
(1975); see also George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful 
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 219–21 (1977). 
 55. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE § 350.3(2) (1975) (“Each prosecution office in the state shall issue 
regulations pursuant to Section 10.3 setting forth guidelines and procedures with respect 
to plea discussions and plea agreements designed to afford similarly situated defendants 
equal opportunities for plea discussions and plea agreements.”). 
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allocution unless special circumstances such as jeopardizing witness 
safety or compromising an ongoing sensitive investigation dictate that it 
be done in camera.  Third, any promises, rewards, or inducements the 
prosecutor makes to the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s 
cooperation against others should be reduced to writing to make future 
Giglio56 disclosures more accurate.57 
With these goals in mind, let me now examine two practices 
sometimes undertaken by prosecutors during plea negotiations that in 
my view are unethical⎯and here I use the term unethical to denote 
moral deficiency.  This will help us test the usefulness of the taxonomy 
described above.  The first scenario is threatening to prosecute a defendant’s 
loved ones unless the defendant pleads guilty upon certain terms.  
Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function prohibits such 
conduct.58  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that this 
practice is fraught with danger,59 and several lower courts have ruled 
that “special care” must be taken in such circumstances to ensure that the 
defendant’s ultimate plea of guilty is not the product of coercion.60 
 56. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (ruling that due process 
requires the prosecutor to disclose to the defendant any “understanding or agreement” 
made to its witnesses so that such material can be used to impeach the government 
witness for bias on cross-examination). 
 57. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, 
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1172–73 (2004). 
 58. Although both the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards establish a threshold of probable cause to commence 
criminal prosecution, neither addresses the circumstances under which a prosecutor may 
threaten prosecution.  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2010), 
with ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ 
standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf. 
 59. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978), the Supreme Court 
ruled that it does not offend due process for a prosecutor to indict the defendant on 
greater charges after the defendant rejects a plea agreement and elects to proceed to trial, 
recognizing that “‘the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable’—and 
permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the 
negotiation of pleas.’”  Id. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 
(1973)).  Even in Bordenkircher, however, the Court stated that threatening the 
prosecution or promising the nonprosecution of third parties “might pose a greater 
danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant 
must consider.”  Id. at 364 n.8 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970)).  
Lower courts since Bordenkircher have found this danger to be at its apex when the third 
party is related to the defendant.  See cases cited infra note 60. 
 60. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Recognizing, however, that threats to 
prosecute third persons can carry leverage wholly unrelated to the validity of the underlying 
charge, we think that prosecutors who choose to use that technique must observe a high 
standard of good faith.  Indeed, absent probable cause to believe that the third person has 
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Threatening family members and loved ones to leverage a guilty plea 
seems improper to me, for at least two reasons.  First, it represents a 
degree of coercion that implicates the autonomy of the defendant and the 
exercise of the defendant’s true volition.61  Forcing a defendant to 
choose between the constitutional right to a trial and the desire to protect 
a loved one impresses me as a cruel and abusive exercise of the state’s 
power—the presentation of a “Sophie’s Choice,”62 as it were.  
Moreover, it implicates the goal of equality.  If the government is 
morally justified in using such leverage, it will necessarily be in a 
stronger plea bargaining position with respect to defendants who choose 
to participate in crimes with family members than it will be with 
defendants who choose to participate in crimes with unrelated 
coconspirators.  No legitimate goal of the criminal law is advanced when 
the former category of offender faces a greater certainty or degree of 
punishment than the latter. 
A second troublesome practice occurs when a prosecutor includes an 
explicit provision in a plea agreement whereby the defendant waives the 
right to later challenge the conviction on the grounds that the defendant 
was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
representation of counsel during the proceedings.  Prosecutors seem to 
be going “waiver crazy” these days, trying to insulate all plea 
agreements from collateral attack on any grounds in order to achieve 
finality to the criminal process.63  Emboldened by Ruiz and the tendency 
of courts to view plea agreements primarily thought the lens of 
committed a crime, offering ‘concessions’ as to him or her constitutes a species of 
fraud.”); see also State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d. 539, 542 (Minn. 1994). 
 61. The American Bar Association suggests that in connection with plea negotiations, a 
prosecutor “should not bring or threaten to bring charges against the defendant or 
another person, or refuse to dismiss such charges, where admissible evidence does not 
exist to support the charges or the prosecuting attorney has no good faith intention of 
pursuing those charges.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PLEAS OF GUILTY 
Standard 14-3.1(h) (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
crimjust/standards/pleasofguilty.pdf.  The commentary to this standard states that such 
“deliberately coercive prosecutorial conduct in plea negotiations undermines the fairness of 
guilty pleas.”  Id. Standard 14-3.1(h) cmt. 
 62. See generally WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979). 
 63. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargaining Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal 
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 
2013 (2000) (noting that plea agreement waivers seem to have “multiplied without limit”); 
Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 246 (2005) (discussing frequency of certain forms of waiver in 
a sample of 971 completed federal plea agreements). 
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contract,64 prosecutors now routinely include in their standard plea 
agreements waiver of the right to appeal the court-imposed sentence; 
waiver of the right to challenge the conviction or sentence through 
collateral attack, such as by habeas petition;65 waiver of statutory rights, 
such as the Speedy Trial Act;66 waiver of the right to contest asset 
forfeiture; waiver of the right to contest deportation; and so forth.  The 
emerging trend seems to be “let’s throw every possible 
waiver”⎯including a waiver to the kitchen sink⎯into a plea agreement 
and see what will stick.  The practice is becoming so common in federal 
courts that the ABA Standards Committee is considering amending the 
Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution Function to discourage certain 
waivers in plea agreements.67 
The most troublesome of these waivers is a waiver of the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.  The case law in the federal circuits on 
whether an appeal waiver can bar a subsequent claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is conflicting.  Some circuits will enforce any 
waiver that is knowing and voluntary, unless such enforcement would 
result in a “miscarriage of justice.”68  Other circuits have carved out an 
express exception to the category of valid waivers for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims,69 and still others have ruled that an appeals 
waiver will bar a subsequent challenge on ineffective counsel grounds if 
it relates to the quality of the representation leading up to the plea or 
 64. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995). 
A sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the interested parties to 
enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any arbitrary limits on their 
bargaining chips.  To use the Ninth Circuit’s metaphor, if the prosecutor is 
interested in “buying” the reliability assurance that accompanies a waiver agreement, 
then precluding waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains.  A defendant 
can “maximize” what he has to “sell” only if he is permitted to offer what the 
prosecutor is most interested in buying. 
Id. 
 65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
 67. See PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5.9: WAIVER OF RIGHTS AS CONDITION OF PLEA 
AGREEMENT (June 2010) (on file with author). 
(b) A prosecutor should not routinely require plea waivers of post-conviction 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or 
destruction of evidence unknown to the defendant at the time of the guilty plea.  
The prosecutor may seek and accept such waivers on an individualized basis if 
knowing and voluntary.  No waiver should be accepted without an exception 
for manifest injustice including actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence. 
Id. 
 68. United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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during sentencing, but not if it alleges constitutionally substandard 
performance that directly tainted the waiver itself.70 
Regardless of whether a reviewing court will enforce a general waiver 
of appellate rights in the face of a subsequent claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the ethical question is whether a prosecutor should 
draft a plea agreement that expressly and specifically waives ineffective 
counsel claims.  This is a question of important consequence because 
although a reviewing court might be willing to entertain a later claim of 
ineffective assistance under the strictest “miscarriage of justice” 
exception to waiver, some convicted defendants might be deterred from 
bringing even the most meritorious of such challenges in the face of a 
written instrument specifically barring it. 
Bar ethics committees in five states have ruled that defense counsel 
may not ethically counsel clients to sign a plea agreement containing an 
express waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, either because 
defense counsel is inherently conflicted on that subject,71 or because 
such a waiver is the functional equivalent of prospectively limiting the 
lawyer’s liability to the client for malpractice in violation of the state’s 
 70. See Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that a 
challenge to the process by which defendant entered into agreement containing waiver 
was not barred, but a challenge to other ineffective conduct by attorney leading up to 
plea could be barred); United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the 
claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Opinion 126: 
Waiver of Post-Conviction Relief (2009), http://www.mobar.org/formal/formal-126.doc 
(interpreting Missouri disciplinary rule 4-1.7(b)(1), the state analogue to Model Rule 
1.7); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion No. 571 (2006) (interpreting Texas 
Disciplinary Rule 1.06, the state analogue to Model Rule 1.7), reprinted in TEX. B.J., 
Jan. 2006, at 790, 790–93.  Under Model Rule 1.7, a concurrent conflict of interest exists 
when there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the 
“personal interest of the lawyer.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) 
(2010).  A future judicial finding of ineffective assistance is against the lawyer’s 
personal interests not only because it could damage the lawyer’s professional reputation 
but also because it could lead to disciplinary action against the lawyer under Model Rule 
1.1.  Id. R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.”).  A 
lawyer may proceed in the face of such a concurrent conflict only if (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes that he will be able to provide competent and diligent representation, 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law, and (3) the client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.  Id. R. 1.7(b).  If any of these three requirements are not met, the 
client must be advised by separate counsel with respect to that aspect of the plea 
agreement. 
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equivalent to Model Rule 1.8(h),72 or on both grounds.73  The Ethics 
Advisory Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Attorneys has issued a similar advisory.74  If these ethical opinions are 
correct, a prosecutor should not be drafting ineffective waivers because 
the defense attorney should not be signing ineffective waivers.75  After 
all, it is improper for a prosecutor to encourage defense counsel to 
engage in any conduct that may violate the applicable rules of 
professional responsibility.76 
Insisting on so-called ineffective counsel waivers impresses me as 
overreaching of the worst sort and fundamentally inconsistent with a 
prosecutor’s obligation as a minister of justice.  As in my first 
hypothetical, it places efficiency at a substantially higher level of 
priority during the plea bargaining process than autonomy and equality.  
When defense counsel may have failed to conduct even the barest 
threshold of investigation or preparation of a client’s case or when 
defense counsel has an undisclosed conflict of interest due to a secret 
representation of an unindicted third party, the voluntariness of the 
defendant’s plea is called into serious question.  Especially considering 
how high a bar the Supreme Court has set to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation,77 constitutionally defective representation strikes 
at the core of the defendant’s ability to choose freely the options 
presented. 
 72. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2001-6 (2001), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2001// 
op%2001-006.doc; Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Advisory Ethics Op. 1994-A-549 
(1994); Vt. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-04 (1995), available at https://www. 
vtbar.org/intus/cms/Display_Page.asp?PageID=5 (follow “Advisory Ethic Opinions” hyperlink; 
then follow “Plea Bargains” hyperlink).  One state, Arizona, has rejected the analogy between 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and malpractice claims for purposes of the 
prospective limitation of liability prohibition in Model Rule 1.8(h).  Ariz. State Bar 
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 95-08 (1995), available at http://www. 
myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=460. 
 73. N.C. State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 129 (1993), available at http://www.ncbar. 
gov/ethics/index.asp (select number “RPC 129”; then follow “View Opinion” hyperlink). 
 74. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Proposed 
Formal Op. 03-02 (2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a6 
4852566d6000daa79/ethicsopinions/$FILE/op03-02.pdf. 
 75. Douglas A. Morris, Waiving an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim: An 
Ethical Conundrum, CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 34, 35–36 (2003). 
 76. Model Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
“knowingly assist or induce” another lawyer to violate the disciplinary rules.  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2010).  When a prosecutor drafts and encourages a 
defense attorney to execute an appeal waiver that purports to waive ineffective assistance 
claims, that prosecutor is essentially abetting a violation of Model Rule 1.8(h).  See Id. R. 
1.8(h) (2010); see also Id. R. 8.4(d) (2010) (requiring that a lawyer shall not “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”). 
 77. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (crafting a two-prong test 
for ineffective claims under the Sixth Amendment). 
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Ineffective counsel waivers also jeopardize the equal treatment of 
similarly situated defendants.  Instead of inspiring defense counsel to 
expend their best possible efforts on behalf of a client, an express waiver 
of ineffective assistance claims signals to the defense bar that they need 
not worry about substandard performance when their clients intend to 
plead guilty.  This has the potential of heightening the disparity in charging 
and sentencing treatment between defendants based on the quality of 
their representation rather than based on the nature and extent of their 
criminal acts.  In a system where approximately ninety-five percent of 
criminal cases are resolved by guilty plea,78 such a government-
induced disincentive to quality representation simply should not be 
tolerated.  Even in Mezzanatto—perhaps the high-water mark of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of plea agreement as contract—the Court 
recognized that “[t]here may be some . . . provisions that are so fundamental 
to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be 
waived without irreparably ‘discredit[ing] the federal courts.’”79 
The enactment of more explicit disciplinary rules detailing a 
prosecutor’s ethical responsibilities during plea bargaining is unlikely.  
As Fred Zacharias so prudently recognized throughout his distinguished 
career, there are “inherent limitations on what ethics rules and the 
disciplinary process can accomplish.”80  Nonetheless, because many 
prosecutors and courts now tend to view plea bargaining only through 
the lens of contract law, encouraging prosecutors to recognize that the 
do-justice mandate of rule 3.8 applies to plea bargaining and is more 
than a hortatory ideal is important.   
Interpreting the general exhortation to do justice in light of the four 
critical plea bargaining objectives I identified above will have several 
salutary effects.  First, it will encourage prosecutors to be more 
introspective about their roles and more thoughtful about their choices.  
Second, it will provide them with some context to order the 
government’s priorities in individual cases.  Third, it might guide them 
toward more consistent and less arbitrary plea bargaining practices 
 78. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 79. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (citing 21 WRIGHT & 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1977)); see also United States v. 
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 575–78 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring) (arguing that 
courts should take systemic goals and integrity of the courts into account in determining 
whether to accept waivers in plea agreements). 
 80. Zacharias & Green, supra note 3, at 58. 
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across the multitude of cases they will handle throughout their careers.  
And finally, as Fred Zacharias himself recognized, putting some flesh on 
the do-justice admonition may help focus the professional training of 
prosecutors and the development of coherent office policies within 
prosecutorial units.81 
 
 
 
 81. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1186–87. 
